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GLOSSARY
Bailiwick

The set of domains and subdomains over which a given DNS
server has authority to maintain records.

Botnet

A collection of computers running a software program to carry
out the functions of a remote and user. These can have both
legitimate purposes as well as malicious ones.

Botmaster

The individual or individuals sending commands remotely to
the infected machines in the botnet. Can also be referred to
as a bot herder.

Covert Channel

The study will use the definition put forth by Tsai, Gligor, and
Chandersekaran (1990) of a covert channel. It is as follows:
“given a nondiscretionary security model M
and its interpretation I(M ) in an operating
system, any potential communication between
two subjects I(Si ) and I(Sj ) of I(M ) is covert
if and only if any communication between the
corresponding subjects I(Si ) and I(Sj ) of the
model M is illegal in M ” (p.1).

C&C

The computer or computers in control of the botnet’s actions

Malware

A portmanteau created from the words “Malicious” &
“Software”
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ABSTRACT
Hands, Nicole M. M.S., Purdue University, August 2016. Detection of
Communication Over DNSSEC Covert Channels. Major Professors: Baijian Yang,
Marcus Rogers, Dongyan Xu.
Unauthorized data removal and modification from information systems
represents a major and formidable threat in modern computing. Security
researchers are engaged in a constant and escalating battle with the writers of
malware and other methods of network intrusion to detect and mitigate this threat.
Advanced malware behaviors include encryption of communications between the
server and infected client machines as well as various strategies for resilience and
obfuscation of infrastructure. These techniques evolve to use any and all available
mechanisms. As the Internet has grown, DNS has been expanded and has been
given security updates. This study analyzed the potential uses of DNSSEC as a
covert channel by malware writers and operators. The study found that changing
information regarding the Start of Authority (SOA) and resigning the zone can
create a covert channel. The study provided a proof of concept for this previously
undocumented covert channel that uses DNSSEC.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
The tone of collegiality and trust upon which the Internet was initially built
has evolved into a frantic cat and mouse game of security versus criminal activity.
The threat is pervasive, it is diverse, and it is ever present. The Internet never
sleeps nor do the criminals who misuse it for various purposes, it seems. It is within
the context of this computing environment of unyielding threat that the following
work has been carried out. Data exfiltration, either of classified data or personally
identifiable information, has been identified as a severe threat for many years and
continues to grow in pervasiveness. Data infiltration also represents a threat to trust
in information systems as well.
Covert channels have been used by cyber criminals to carry out the removal
and placement of data and/or programs (such as malware). Due to the hidden
nature of these communication paths, their existence may be unknown and the
unsuspecting target does not even know to look for such a threat. As an example,
botnets use differing methods of communicating with each other and their command
and control. The Domain Name Services (DNS) upon whose functionality nearly
every Internet transaction relies is used by some botnets as a covert channel.
DNSSEC was introduced in order to provide security to this foundational
protocol. Like the rest of the Internet, DNS was initially built without security in
mind. The a posteriori security measures of DNSSEC have attempted to remediate
the known dangers to DNS (such as cache spoofing). To the best of our knowledge,
at the time of writing, the use of DNSSEC as a covert channel had not yet been
investigated and thus it was unknown whether or not the security extensions
provided any protection against the covert pernicious form of botnet communication.
This study engaged in an attempt to investigate DNSSEC covert channels.
Covert channel formation over DNSSEC by botnets and other malware represents a
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significant threat to sensitive digital information, and therefore identifying covert
channels before sensitive data is lost or modified is essential.

1.1 Scope
At the time of writing and to the best available knowledge, no known
malware creates covert channels specifically using the security extensions to DNS
(DNSSEC). This study attempted to ascertain what potential exists for exploitation
of the security extensions and the mechanisms associated with updating zone
information and signatures. Specifically, the study asks does a unique covert
channel exist within DNSSEC that would not be identified by Intrusion Detection
Systems and Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems in their
present configurations?
For the purposes of this study, a protocol analysis was carried out and when
a potential weakness was identified, a proof of concept prototype was created to
demonstrate the functionality or lack of functionality of the channel. Though the
protocol analysis was extensive, every potential covert channel was not investigated
to the point of prototyping. These were left for future work.

1.2 Significance
Network administrators adopt tools to protect the resources with which they
are entrusted. These tools constantly change as a result of the evolution of the
threats against which they are tasked to defend. Any attack against the DNS
infrastructure has the potential to do great harm to the millions of users who rely
on it to work invisibly in the background. Attacks have successfully disrupted the
Internet activities of millions of individuals, significantly in an incident in China
that took place in 2014 where millions of individuals were redirected to a website
that would otherwise have been blocked (Mozur, 2014).
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When malware uses the DNS infrastructure, it takes advantage of a largely
unmonitored and unfiltered protocol to conduct its malicious business (Fulton,
2015). Though malware can misuse DNS in a number of ways, one dangerous
misuse is the creation of a covert channel to either exfiltrate or infiltrate data into
or out of an unauthorized system. Consider an example corporation that owns
valuable machinery and has physical assets that is worth tens of billions of dollars,
while a social media site is worth hundreds of billions of dollars. This situation hints
at opportunities for income generation through the theft, poisoning, or destruction
of data. In fact, the market for data has many offerings, from Personally Identifiable
Information (PII) to browsing history, medical records, passport scans, among many
others. The prices of these vary from a dollar to hundreds of dollars according to a
report from TrendMicro (Huq, 2015). With the number of records for sale in the
millions, at almost any price, the potential for profit is present. Though specifics
have not been reported, it is through an extension of this market driven crime
model that the potential for profit could come from the destruction or modification
of data as well.
Distributed computing has many uses including the processing of scientific
data in projects such as SETI@home. SETI would be considered a non-malicious
botnet and other scientific distributed computing systems can accomplish incredible
data processing. When malware infects hundreds, thousands, or millions of
computers, the processing tasks that can be accomplished are limited only by the
malware writer’s imagination and ability. The abilities of malware writers are
moving away from those that have previously been characterized as skids or script
kiddies (those who use a template to write unsophisticated code to carry out simple
malicious tasks), to state level actors and organized crime. This means that
researchers are increasingly needing to recognize that their target is not only
moving, but accelerating. The creation of DNSSEC was meant to help address the
initial unsecured infrastructure and to protect against certain specific attacks
against DNS. This study is born from the recognition that, though implementation
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of the DNS security extensions has been slow, that it is a new territory that the
given the opportunity, cyber criminals will inhabit first, creating a situation where
new adopters are not expecting that the system is already insecure. Research has
been conducted to determine DNSSEC’s susceptibility to attacks such as
amplification attacks (van Rijswijk-Deij, Sperotto, & Pras, 2014) that also affected
DNS before the extensions were added. This work attempts to investigate another
aspect of DNSSEC that may be vulnerable to attack, that is it’s potential for usage
as a covert channel. In the present computing environment, not only is there
economic risk associated with failure to secure DNSSEC against this method of
communication, but these data attacks have also have political, personal, physical
security, and privacy implications.

1.3 Research Question
At the time of the thesis proposal, this research proposed to seek an answer
to the following research question: Given large scale DNS and DNSSEC passive
traffic captures collected from global domains across TLDs, do character frequency
analysis and entropy analysis measures used to detect DNS covert channels continue
to uncover covert channels when DNSSEC is used? This question has been
modified. This study sought instead to answer the following research question:
What features of DNSSEC could be exploited to create DNSSEC specific covert
channels? What characteristics would such a covert channel have?
The study investigated the hypothesis that DNSSEC specific covert channels
exist.

1.4 Assumptions
This study was conducted acknowledging the following assumptions:

5
• A model of attacker was assumed to have remote or local access to the
compromised machine.
• This attacker may be a malicious insider or a malicious stranger.
• The goal of the attacker’s activity was theft or insertion of data (that is to say
that the data transfer may take place from client to server or vice versa).
• The attacker was assumed to have access to (or skills to create) a tunneling
tool that is sophisticated in nature, using all known present day obfuscation
techniques.
• The attacker was assumed to have access to the authoritative name server for a
domain. This domain could either belong to the attacker or could be hijacked.

1.5 Limitations
The limitations for this study include the following:
• The study was conducted using a registered domain name under the control of
the author, however the domain was not configured as part of a chain of trust
through the registrar (parent) due to an unresolved technical problem on the
registrar’s end. This limited the applicability of the results to islands of trust
as opposed to more common chains of trust.
• DNSSEC Look-aside Validation (DLV) was no longer available for zones that
could validate to the Root. As “.org” is a zone that has root signing
availability, DLV was unavailable as an alternative chain of trust.

1.6 Delimitations
The delimitations for this study include:
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• Though tunneling applications exist in open source format, modifying such a
tool to include the new tunneling technique would not have been a trivial
task. Including the full suite of functionality associated with such tools is out
of scope of this work.
• The study implemented a tunnel in a direct plain-text to binary conversion
without encryption. Though encryption could add to the ability of the data to
remain hidden should the covert channel be discovered, it does not add to the
covertness of the channel. Therefore, encryption was not implemented.
• The DNS name servers were set up using BIND version 9, due to BIND being
the most common name server software, and an open source software. Bind is
maintained and developed by the Internet Systems Consortium (ISC).
• The implementation was only tested using Ubuntu clients and servers. No
Windows machines were tested. Windows does implement DNS differently
than BIND and therefore could possibly yield different results. This research
is left for future study.

1.7 Summary
This chapter has highlighted the scope, limitations, delimitations, and
assumptions upon which this study was conducted. Chapter 2 reviews the relevant
literature on DNS, botnets, DNSSEC and attempts to identify gaps in the literature.
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CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE
The DNS protocol is a foundational part of the Internet. It was created in
RFC 1034 (Mockapetris, 1983) and RFC 1035 (Mockapetris, 1987). DNS is a
distributed database of records associating IP addresses with domain names. The
database also keeps track of the servers that have authority over the records
associated with a given domain. Without this database, instead of being able to
type in www.example.com, which is easy for a human to remember, the user would
need to remember the IP address 93.184.216.34. In some cases, many websites share
the same IP address, or have many IP addresses associated with them. DNS allows
differentiation of these domains and makes the use of the Internet as it is known
possible.
At a very basic level, the way a request by a user for a web address gets
translated into a connection starts with an application, such as a web browser,
asking the client-side resolver to initiate the search for the IP answer. The resolver
has some data locally, including the IP address of the name server it is expected to
send its query to. This name server is a recursive server. The recursive server will
request data from one of the root servers who will in turn direct the recursive servers
to the authoritative name server for the domain originally requested. The recursive
server gives the answer it has received to the resolver, and the resolver can now
establish a connection with the website’s IP. Each DNS request contains different
fields, including an identification number (QID), the source IP, the destination IP,
source and destination ports, checksums, and the question or answer data itself.
The structure of a DNS packet is discussed at length in a later section. ***
Security researchers have recognized the need for protection to DNS since at
least 1995 when Paul Vixie analyzed the software BIND, and found serious flaws in
the implementation of DNS through BIND (Vixie, 1995). The public was made
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aware of the threats outlined by Vixie in 1997, when a protester named Eugene
Kashpureff (Wayner, 1997) conducted a modification to the DNS database that
directed individuals attempting to reach InterNIC’s website to his own. This was
possible due to the way that DNS servers cache results of queries. Kashpureff’s
attack was a cache poisoning attack (a type of spoofing attack), such that the
records served by the resovers were the poisoned records and not the original and
legitimate ones. This attack can be prevented by ensuring that forwarding DNS
name servers handle only internal DNS queries. When they handle recursive
external queries, they are potentially open to the cache poisoning attack. Dan
Kaspersky combined the cache poisoning technique with that of correctly “guessing”
the QID for a query to demonstrate another very severe vulnerability in DNS (and
an effective way to spoof an answer to a DNS query).
In the information security field, three goals are traditionally identified:
integrity, availability, and confidentiality. In 2002, DNS root servers were subjected
to a DDoS attack, and 9 of the 13 root servers in operation at the time were affected
(Baranowski, 2003). DoS and DDoS, cache poisoning or other spoofing attacks
affect the availability of DNS. Cache poisoning and spoofing also affect integrity.
DNS is, by nature, public information and is not generally expected to be
confidential.
The malware threat landscape is constantly changing and evolving rapidly as
the perpetual threat-mitigation-threat-escalation cycle continues with security
researchers and malware writers both utilizing all available resources to meet their
goals. Of all the modern threats, botnets are frequently cited as high priority
(Comey, 2015; Norton, 2007; Thakar, 2013) due to the diverse potential for
criminal activity they provide, with the number of individuals who could fall victim
ranging from the hundreds in a small botnet to millions in a larger one. A botnet
can be defined as a system of computers that are under the control of a criminal,
typically referred to as the botmaster, after having been infected by a piece of
malware (a worm, virus, Trojan) that took advantage of a vulnerability or exploit to
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provide remote access and control of the machine. Though the first botnets were
not malicious in nature, this rapidly changed (Tyagi & Aghila, 2011). Malicious
and nefarious activities that currently involve botnets include the sending of spam
(unsolicited email), distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, identity/password
theft, remote storage of illegal files, financial theft, spread of additional malware
payloads, the manipulation of online polls or games (S. S. Silva, Silva, Pinto, &
Salles, 2013), among others.
With the severity of this threat in mind, the study examines the
functionality of botnets and in particular it looks at the communication strategies
utilized. Covert channels and encryption have been used by malware writers to help
hide their malicious activities. This provides a useful context for examining covert
channel functionality.

2.1 The Structure of a DNS Packet
In order to best examine the ways in which DNS can be exploited to create covert
channels, the structure of the packet should be considered.
bits
0***4***8***12***16***20***24***28***32
Query ID (QID)

Flags& Codes

Question Count (QC)

AN(swer)Count

NameServer Count

Additional Record Count

Question Name (DNS notation)

Question Type

Question Class

Figure 2.1.: DNS Header Format

10
According to RFC 1035 (Mockapetris, 1987), the first 16 bit word in the
DNS packet header contains a query ID number. RFC 1035 (Mockapetris, 1987)
and RFC 4035 (Arends, Austein, Larson, Massey, & Rose, 2005b) define the second
16-bit word in the header as containing various flags and codes, which include the
following. The “QR” flag consists of one bit to indicate message is either a query or
a response. The Opcode is 4 bits, to indicate if the query is a query, status request,
a notification of zone changes, or a dynamic update. The “AA” flag indicates if the
answer is authoritative. The “TC” bit is set when the message is larger than a given
packet size (traditionally 512 bytes) and had to be truncated. If recursion is desired,
the “RD” bit is set. If recursion is available, the “RA” bit is set. Z was once 3 bits
whose values were long reserved and must have been set to zero. The updates to
DNS redefined thes bits. The first of which (bit 9 in the header) remains reserved.
The other two bits have been allocated now for DNSSEC purposes. If the “AD” bit
is set, the data is Authenticated Data (as part of DNSSEC). If “CD” is set, then
checking the authentication has been disabled. The last bit of the flags and codes
section is the Rcode, 4 bits to indicate server status upon replying to queries. These
codes include codes for “no error”, “format error”, “NX RR” for a resource record set
that should exist but does not or “YX RR” for a resource record set that should not
exist but does.
The DNS message portion of the packet has a structure of three main
sections: the question section, the authority section, and the additional section. Not
all sections are present in all queries or responses.
The Question Name is formated in DNS name notation. This label is
formatted to encode the fully qualified domain name, starting with the lowest level
domain (LLD) and ending with the root (.). The domain “domain.example.com.”
would be encoded starting with two bits to indicate the type of label. Two 0’s would
indicate it is a standard name label. The example domain name would be encoded
as 00[6]domain[7]example[3]com[0]. Each value in the square brackets indicates the
length of the label to follow. The maximum length of any label is 63 bits. The
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bits
0***4***8***12***16***20***24***28***32

Question Name

Question Type

Question Class

Figure 2.2.: Question Format for DNS Message

maximum total length of the domain is 255 bits. The encoding ends with the zero
because the root has zero length.
Two 1’s at the beginning of the label encoding indicate the label is
compressed. This tells the DNS software that a pointer follows and it will then
continue parsing the message from the location indicated by the pointer. The
pointer exists as an offset from the beginning of the packet, starting at zero. The
initial bits for a label “01” indicates that EDNS is available. EDNS is the extension
mechanism for DNS. This allows the message, which would historically have been
limited to 512-bytes, to be extended to be as long as either client or server
machine’s memory buffer can handle. Setting this flag adds on an additional section
to the query/response that further makes DNSSEC possible.
If EDNS is available, the additional section added is the OPT pseudo-section
(Vixie, 1999). This section contains three key pieces of information at the present
time. The first is the version of EDNS in use (at the time of writing this was “0”).
The next is a one bit flag indicating if DNSSEC is okay (“DO”). If the query has the
“DO” bit set and the authoritative nameserver has signed its records, it MUST
return signed records (Vixie, 1999). If the domain is not signed, then there will be
no DNSSEC resource records in the response. The memory buffer size is the final
value and this negotiates the size of the DNS datagrams that can be exchanged.
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Whichever value is smaller, that from the client or server, becomes the agreed upon
size.
The Answer packet sent contains the same header, but it has a different
body containing three areas, the Answer, the Authority, and the Additional. Any
extended information associated with DNSSEC (a resource record signature, for
example) is included in the Additional Section when the extension bit and the “do”
(DNSSEC OK) bits are set.
bits
0***4***8***12***16***20***24***28***32
Answer Name
Answer Type

Answer Class

TTL

Length of RDATA field
RDATA

Authority
Authority Type

Authority Class

TTL

Length of RDATA field
RDATA

Additional
Additional Type

Additional Class

TTL

Length of RDATA field
RDATA

Figure 2.3.: Answer Format for DNS Message
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2.2 Attempting to Secure DNS
According to Arends et al. (2005b), “The DNS Security Extensions are a
collection of new resource records and protocol modifications that add data origin
authentication and data integrity to the DNS.” The resource records added included
a public encryption key (DNSKEY), a signer (DS), a digital signature for the
resource record in question (RRSIG), and an authenticated denial of existence
(NSEC) (Arends, Austein, Larson, Massey, & Rose, 2005a). While DNSSEC
addresses the integrity issue (and the availability issues that a lack of integrity can
lead to), DNSSEC does not, in general, address availability issues or add
confidentiality to DNS.
The administrator of a DNS domain is in charge of that domain’s zone.
When implementing DNSSEC, cryptographic signatures and keys are used to
protect the authenticity of the DNS data. The administrator creates two
public-private key pairs, one for the zone (Zone Signing Key or ZSK), and one for
the key (Key Signing Key or KSK). Each time a new resource record (RR) is added
to the zone (such as a new nameserver (NS) record), a cryptographic signature is
created for that new record. The zone administrator uses the generated private keys
to sign the set of resource records that make up the zone. Then another signature is
created, the delegation of signing (DS) record, which is transfered to the parent
authority for the zone. This begins the chain of trust up to the root (.) zone. The
parent validates the DS record, who in turn has had its DS records validated, all the
way to the root. Several top level domains (TLDs) have been signed, but many have
not. DNSSEC is only available to those zones whose TLD has been signed. The
alternate method of creating a chain of trust was once through DNS look-aside
validation (DLV), through which the Internet Systems Consortium (ISC), would
provide validation in place of the root signing process. ISC has stopped accepting
new zones for validation at this time, and in 2017 will remove all zones from the
DLV service.
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When a DNSSEC query is made, the records are authenticated using the RRs
and the DS records mentioned above. First, an application such as a web browser
will request a resource record for example.com. Since an authenticated response is
desired, the label for example.com will be initiated with the two bits indicating that
EDNS is available (01). There will be an OPT pseudosection included in the query
and the “DO” bit will be set. The authoritative nameserver for example.com will
respond with an answer packet giving the requested resource record for example.com
(likely to be an “A” record if the request originated from a web browser). This
resource record will appear in plain text in the answer section. A cryptograpically
signed resource record will be included in the additional section. The DNSSEC
aware resolver will request the public key for example.com, and a key will be
returned. The resolver will do some mathematical checking of the answers. It will
hash the “A” record it receives. It will decrypt the signed resource record with the
DNSKEY to reveal the signed hash. It will compare the two hash values and will
either accept the answer or reject it, depending on whether or not the hashes match.
The process of a resolving DNSSEC aware nameserver querying a DNSSEC
signed domain is shown in Figure 1.1 below.

Figure 2.4.: DNSSEC Query Response Validation Process
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2.3 The Threats
The usage of DNS by botnet operators and malware writers poses significant
challenges to detection and mitigation. Among the consequences of this usage is the
utilization of a covert channel that seems particularly effective in achieving the
criminal goals of the malware. This is, in part, due to the typical lack of filtration of
DNS traffic (Dietrich et al., 2011). If the communication channel of a botnet can
be cut off, the lifeline between the botmaster and the botnet is also cut. This
underscores the importance of work done to identify communication between nodes
in a botnet. It is important to note that computers infected with botnet malware
that are unable to communicate with their botmaster are still infected with that
malware. Those machines could be a latent threat worthy of consideration in
another study.

2.3.1 Botnet Communication and Topology
The earliest botnets utilized IRC as a communication channel
between the botmaster and each machine in the net (Norton, 2007). Over time,
security professionals have begun to recognize the signs that an IRC channel or user
has nefarious intent, and these botnets have been largely mitigated as a result.
Additional communication methodologies exist, and malware writers are taking
advantage of HTTP, P2P, and DNS to send commands and updates to the bot
machines and to exfiltrate user data.
Botnets’ topologies have evolved over time, and when considering the
potential threat detection and mitigation strategies, one must consider the end goal.
Meeting that goal will likely require understanding the structure of the botnet. For
some individuals, it is enough to ensure that a single machine is no longer part of
the botnet. Doing so may require knowing how that machine is receiving its
communications and blocking that process. Should the goal be to cut off
communication between the botmaster and the rest of the botnet, certainly
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understanding the structure of the botnet will facilitate that. Perhaps most
importantly, if the goal is to locate the botmaster, the only way to do that is to
understand the path of communications and find the leaked data pointing to
his/her/their location.
Many topologies exist in the world of botnets (Ollmann, 2009). The
original structure of a botnet was the star topology. In the center, there existed a
single Command and Control (C&C) server, and each bot communicated directly
with it. There were several advantages, if you were the botmaster, to this approach,
including the high speed of control from the central location. No advanced planning
was required. Botnets then evolved to utilize multiple C&C servers. These servers
would be capable of communicating with one another, and with a sub-section of the
bots. Though the multi-server structure allowed for the botnet to continue to
operate when one server was located and taken offline, it was still possible to use
information leaked in communications between any machine in the botnet to
uncover the number and location of the other machines. This included the location
and number of C&C machines, leaving the botmaster open to the possibility of
being found and held accountable for his/her crimes.
In order to protect against the ability to enumerate the number of bots
within the botnet, and to better protect the C&C server from location, a
hierarchical structure was created. This succeeds because no bot is able to locate all
the other bots. The botmaster is hidden beneath layers of bots. This structure led
to the ability to sell portions of the botnet to an interested party while still
maintaining control over other branches of the net.
Of the botnet topololgies, perhaps the most difficult for security professionals
to shut down is the random topology. This provides a high level of resilience for the
botnet due to the fact that when lacking a central C&C, locating the botmaster is
near impossible, and any and all other machines can take over the duties of a given
machine should it be taken off the network. However, by monitoring the network
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communications between the bots from an infected machine, at least the number of
bots can be determined.
Since it is quite expensive to set-up and maintain a botnet (Tyagi & Aghila,
2011), resilience is a key quality a botmaster strives for in the design of the botnet.
As security professionals found themselves able to locate C&C servers and perhaps
send out communications to the bots to kill or uninstall the botnet software, the
botmasters looked for means of protecting their communications, their command
centers, and thus their financial investment. As is true in information security in
general, any tool available to the adversary is one available to the victim - and vice
versa.

2.3.2 Building Resilience
Resilience is a key quality a botmaster strives for in the design of the botnet
(Gallagher, 2013). Botnet operators and have begun to use a type of service
network that creates resilience called Fast-Flux. Fluxing exists in two major groups:
IP or Domain-based flux.

2.3.2.1. Domain Flux
Domain flux is the mapping of a single IP address to a set of fully qualified
domain names (FQDNs). The botmaster takes advantage of the DNS infrastructure
by utilizing one of two types of domain flux. The first is wildcarding subdomains.
For example in the domain name *.example.com, the * represents any sub-domain
within test.com, such as askjwo.example.com and botnet.example.com. This allows
the botmaster to track individual bots on his/her net and to measure the success of
his/her malware campaign. The second approach utilizes Domain Generation
Algorithms to generate a set of domain names each day that the botmaster will
register. One of which will become that day’s command and control update location
for the malware. When the number of such domains is as large as 50k per day
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(Porras, Saidi, & Yegneswaran, 2009), the botmaster has an effective cloak from
behind which s/he can hide.
The Conficker worm was an example of botnet malware utilizing a Domain
Generation Algorithm (DGA). In its early days, it generated only 250 domains each
day (Porras et al., 2009). Though a significant number, it is far fewer than the 50k
domains eventually generated daily in later versions (Burton, 2010). Utilizing DNS
services to look up each domain name and determine which one would resolve was
the worm’s calling card to phone home to the C&C server. Once it found the actual
domain for the day, it was able to send information to and receive information from
the C&C (Burton, 2010). This worm infected millions of machines at one point in
its lifetime and it is continuing to send spam from currently infected machines
(Selter, 2014). Once the DGA was reverse engineered, global registrars cooperated
(ICANN.org, 2010) to block the collection of Conficker domains from registration,
thereby blocking the botnet’s mechanism for update, command, and control.
Conficker was perhaps the first botnet to utilize domains in place of IP addresses,
and thus the first to utilize DNS.
Though Conficker is still in the wild infecting machines, it has had to evolve
in order to continue to survive due to the collective effort of many registrars,
Internet security professionals, and law enforcement around the globe to stop the
registration of Conficker domains (ICANN.org, 2010). Once the Conficker Domain
Generation Algorithm’s functionality was determined, it was possible to predict the
set of domains that would be generated on a given day. The set of all such domains
were then blocked from registration, theoretically shutting down the botnet’s
mechanism for update, command, and control. Conficker represented the first
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botnet to utilize domains in place of IP addresses, and thus the first to utilize the
DNS infrastructure.

2.3.2.2. IP Flux

IP flux is the opposite of domain flux where many IP addresses are mapped
to a single fully qualified domain name. By rapidly cycling through multiple IP
addresses, the botmaster increases the likelihood of the botnet’s survival. IP flux,
also referred to as fast flux, comes in two main flavors: single and double flux. The
key difference between the two flavors is the use of a “bullet-proof” DNS hosting
service/company as the DNS server in single flux, versus the use of a rotating set of
bots as proxies in double flux. In a double flux network, the botmaster controls a
server that has been referred to as “the mothership” (Salusky & Danford, 2008),
which is the C&C hiding under a cloak of infected machine’s identities.
Under this extra level of obfuscation in double flux, it is difficult for
authorities to locate the mothership to shut down the botnet. But single-flux offers
strong protection as well. In the professional experiences of the author detecting
and shutting down phishing attacks, it has become clear that the length of time
between the detection and the shut down of an attack is largely a function of the
cooperativeness and responsiveness of the authority in charge of providing services
keeping the fraudulent content online. An attack can be online for years if the
authority, such as the one in control of the authoritative name server, is
uncooperative.

2.3.3 DNS Covert Channels
A covert channel is a stealthy data-transfer method that avoids typical
detection/blockage methods such as firewalls and Intrustion Detection Systems
(IDS). In addition to utilizing DNS as a mechanism for hiding the location of the
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C&C and increasing the resilience of the botnet, malware writers have also been
utilizing DNS as a covert channel (Bromberger, 2011) to hide their existence and
whereabouts. DNS signaling and DNS tunneling are two methods utilized.
In DNS signaling, a field within the query can be set to convey a message.
For example, a covert channel can be created by using the TTL field. Odd values
could signal “yes” and even values would signal “no.” As Hoffman, Johnson, Yuan,
and Lutz (2012) noted, more than a binary signaling can be accomplished in the
TTL field due to the unformatted nature of the field. The digits can represent
anything. This would move the use of the TTL field from a signal to a tunnel.
DNS Tunneling represents a more direct threat than DNS Signaling as entire
protocols such as HTTP, SFTP, and FTP are encoded. The DNS queries can
construct a VPN between the botmaster and bots concealed within the mass of
normal DNS traffic (OpenDNS, 2012). In many implementations, the lower level
domains in DNS requests made to the authoritative DNS server for a fraudulent
domain (or its proxy) contain stolen data such as passwords or account numbers,
and the responses can contain commands for updating the botnet software
(Rasmussen, 2012). There are several characteristics that can help to identify this
type of traffic. As a result of the encoding of data into a subdomain, the domain
names being resolved are going to have higher entropy than the typical legitimate
DNS query (Zhang, Papadopoulos, & Massey, 2013). The attempt to exfiltrate
data in this manner suggests that the appended subdomain will take advantage of
the bounds on the length of DNS fields, would be maximized - total character length
according to RFC 1035 is 255 bytes, and any single label has a maximum length of
63 bytes. Therefore, labels using the maximum character lengths are suspected of
being representative of DNS tunneling traffic (Farnham, 2013). Beyond the use of
subdomains, the other resource records are used, such as the TXT record
(OpenDNS, 2012). The TXT record is commonly used due to its larger data size,
but other fields can contain the covert data as well. The use of the other fields may
necessitate a greater number of DNS queries to complete the data transfer,
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increasing the likelihood of detection. However, DNS queries are traditionally not
monitored and thus, even an excessive number of queries would go unnoticed.
Feederbot, discovered by Dietrich et al. (Dietrich et al., 2011), is an
example of malware utilizing DNS signaling as its command and control mechanism.
According to the analysis of Dietrich et. al, it sends its upstream messages in the
rdata field of the TXT record and it encrypts this data by using the RC4 stream
cipher. This use of encryption can be both a method of obfuscation as well as a clue
to aid in detection.
Though covert channels over DNS can be used to exfiltrate data, they can
also be used to infiltrate data. This threat has not been analyzed in the literature,
but the ability of a botnet to send data into a system that can manipulate the
information on the system would be damaging to businesses finding themselves
unable to trust that their customer data, tax records, accounting information,
and/or secret recipes have integrity. Similarly, breaking into an information system
and placing an announcement on a key news outlet’s social media site could cause
stock market panics as Ovide (2013) notes happened a couple years ago.

2.4 Detection and Mitigation of Botnets
When botmasters combine resilient topologies with other advanced malware
stealth techniques, such as utilizing covert channels and encryption, the possibility
of mitigation and detection seems daunting if not impossible. However, several
methods have been utilized to various levels of success in the past.

2.4.1 Deep Packet Inspection
Deep packet inspection represents a highly invasive and privacy destroying
method of potential botnet discovery whereby the packet headers and payload are
examined. The examination of the payload includes identification of TCP or UDP
headers and potentially details the actual data. It is problematic to inspect every
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packet sent in an organization in order to potentially locate a botnet because the
entity doing the inspection may not be able to be neutral as the content of the
traffic is observed (Sloan & Warner, 2013). This could lead to a number of
problems that could potentially have a greater impact on a greater number of
people than the botnets do. Also problematic for this method is the idea that the
content of the packet may be encrypted. Without the key, or a sufficiently weak
encryption algorithm allowing for cracking of the key in a reasonable time, this
method would be unable to reveal any information beyond that of the headers.

2.4.2 Network Flow Analysis
Network flow records were described by the SANS Institute (Gennuso,
2012) as acting like a telephone bill. They fail to indicate the content of the
conversation, but they do communicate who talked with whom. The data contained
in a network flow includes the source and destination IP addresses, the router
interface used, and the ports for UDP or TCP that were used. There are several
protocols for conducting network flows created by proprietary switch and router
manufacturers, such as Cisco or Juniper, as well as some open source alternatives.
Many botnet location tools have been created utilizing the proprietary protocols,
such as Botfinder (Tegeler, Fu, Vigna, & Kruegel, 2012) and Botsniffer (Gu,
Zhang, & Lee, 2008). However, there are issues with these programs as a result of
the utilization of these proprietary protocols, including the inability to use the tools
on products made by other manufacturers. These proprietary protocols rely on a
fixed format for defining the flow; in order to model the flexibility of the malware
writers, the tool used to locate them must also be flexible.
An open source alternative is called IPFIX. IPFIX was utilized by
Wijesinghe, Tupakula, and Varadharajan (2015), et al. in their work to enhance
botnet detection. These researchers utilized simulations and virtualizations of bot
traffic as well as publicly available botnet datasets to find the features that could be
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utilized to recognize infection with a piece of botnet malware. This ultimately relies
on patterns to use as signatures for various families of bots. It would not be able to
identify a bot on which their model had not been previously trained.

2.4.3 Sinkholing - Spoofing Authoritative DNS Server
Sinkholing has proved to be a powerful tool against known DNS-based
botnet threats (Bruneau, 2010). This technique utilizes blacklists (known malware
domains) and redirects traffic destined for those domains or for domains that meet
criteria set by the administrator of the internal DNS server. Implementing this
strategy with rules beyond the known blacklist theoretically allows for the
redirection of traffic that could be associated with malware, but simultaneously
allows for false positives, which could be detrimental to the end user. In the case of
the Polish CERT detailed in (CERT, 2013), the CERT got involved and was able
to create a sinkhole that worked to ensure the paths to false positives were
protected and thus only actual malware domains were identified. The Polish CERT
was also able to use their sinkhole data to identify the registrar operating with the
specific intent to allow the registration of domains to be used in illegal activities.
They were then able to take it over. This represented an enormous effort on the
part of many entities and individuals and could serve as a model for the successful
use of a sinkhole in mitigating the botnet malware threat.
It is, however, unlikely that the average network administrator is going to be
able to implement this strategy to such a level of success. Sinkholes exist that have
been created as commercial enterprises, with their own locations carefully hidden so
that malware writers cannot protect against them (Bruneau, 2010). These
sinkholes raise their own ethical issues as they are in a position to collect personally
identifiable information of the malware victims. This information is part of their
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business model, thus making them questionably as unethical as the malware stealing
that information in the first place.

2.4.4 DNS Cache Snooping
This technique has strong capabilities of identifying networks utilizing fast
flux. Fabian and Terzis (2007) utilized this strategy in order to estimate the lower
bound of the size of a fast flux botnet. This technique could reveal some useful
information about the structure of a botnet. It can do so by utilizing the
partitioning of the Internet by hosts and the DNS servers responsible for them, and
by mapping out, within a particular partition, the extent of the connection between
a particular domain and a given piece of malware. Again, the threat must be known
for this to serve any purpose at all and its utility is limited, at best.

2.4.5 Reverse Engineering
In order to gain an understanding of the functionality of a piece of malware
code, without having access to its uncompiled source code, researchers or security
personnel can attempt to reverse engineer the code. According to Plohmann et al.
from ENISA, via reverse engineering it is possible to classify the malware into
families, and occasionally to find signatures for traditional detection (Plohmann,
Gerhards-Padilla, & Leder, 2011). The means of installation, communication
methods, and means of malware dissemination can be learned.
There are two types of reverse engineering analyses: static and dynamic. If
information is learned without executing the binary, then the analysis could be
considered to be static. In a carefully controlled environment, one can execute the
binary and conduct a dynamic analysis. Changes to the infected system could be
measured through this technique, such as attempts to connect to the network,
registry files modified, and behaviors such as searching for credentials or keylogging
(Plohmann et al., 2011). This requires a large amount of technical skill and is
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beyond many researchers. It also requires that one have access to at least the binary
of the file, so again, it is only useful in attacks that are known and for which that
resource is available.

2.4.6 Honeynets
A honeynet is a very comprehensive strategy for protecting a network from
intrusion, including against social engineering attempts (Munro, 2015). Social
engineering can be a means through which botnet malware is spread. Honeypots are
single machines set up to be purposefully exploitable and attractive to attackers. A
honeynet is a network of at least two such machines. In order for this setup to be
comprehensive, the machines must appear to be used by a real person such that the
attacker will believe there is possibly valuable personal or corporate information to
obtain by breaking in to that machine or network. The creation of a honeynet can
allow for the collection of malware samples (Martin, 2001) and thus, any of the
reverse engineering benefits can be gained from that sample.

2.4.7 Statistical Packet Analysis
Using statistical analysis of the text contained within the fields of DNS
queries, multiple studies use an entropy measure of the encrypted text in the covert
channel to identify anomalous traffic (Born & Gustafson, 2010; Dietrich et al.,
2011). Machine learning algorithms are used strongly in these methods of detection
of anomalous traffic. The basic idea is that the distribution of letters would be
different in encrypted text than in plaintext, and thus by determining that
distribution statistically, one could determine, without direct, invasive deep packet
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inspection, the content of the packet and whether it likely came from a human or
the bot.

2.4.8 Topological Data Utilization
Dagon et al. (Dagon, Zou, & Lee, 2006) investigated the importance of time
zones in malware operations. They determined after studying dozens of botnets over
a period of six months that these malware samples demonstrated clear day-night
(diurnal) behavior. As recognized by Porras et al. (2009) regarding Conficker,
Dagon et al. noted that many botnets display a regional preference/avoidance
mechanism for execution. In the case of Conficker, if the malware found that it was
located in the Ukraine (by use of the Ukrainian keyboard), the code would exit and
not execute. The day-night patterns could help identify botnet malware’s presence
as well as the location of the infected machines geographically. As with many of the
other techniques, this is not effective against zero-day attacks.
One clue that arises from bots that query regularly but receive active
instruction from their C&C only during particular time periods is that of the
presence of the loopback and RFC 1918 addresses in a response to an external
domain question. This answer could be utilized by the botnet malware in a number
of ways. It would serve as an acknowledgement that the C&C was still available,
but did not have instructions for the bot at the time. It would also be a way of the
bot exfiltrating data through the question query without giving an IP address
location of the authoritative name server for the fraudulent domain that might
easily appear in someone’s logs. In either case, this exposes an attribute of covert
channel traffic data: the presence of the loopback or RFC 1918 addresses.

2.4.9 Passive DNS
Florian Weimer introduced an architecture for the passive collection of DNS
records in 2005 (Weimer, 2005). It was proposed that though Mockapetris (1987)
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suggested that the entire DNS database could never be known, a subset of the
database could be known. DNS resolvers were recruited to participate and the
records of DNS queries they handled could be replicated and stored. The passive
DNS records collected are accessible to security researchers and network
administrators. A reconstruction process takes place in order to sort the received
DNS queries into three separate categories: UDP_QUERY_RESPONSE,
UDP_UNANSWERED_QUERY, and UDP_UNSOLICITED_RESPONSE (Edmonds, 2012).
Edmonds (2012) reports that this filtering helps make the passive database robust
against a spoofing attack. Additional filtering of the data is done, including
discarding all but the UDP_QUERY_RESPONSE records, any record with the truncated
(TC) bit set (which means that the query would have been resent over TCP). The
processing of the data collected by the passive DNS server participants is extensive,
and unfortunately for the purpose of detecting botnet communication, many
lookups that resemble tunneled lookups are discarded in the static filtering process
(Edmonds, 2012), however these discarded queries are sent to a discard channel
where they may be able to be identified. The passive DNS database also makes raw,
real–time data available and thus the duplicated traffic and discarded queries would
be available from that.

2.4.10 Active DNS Querying
There are a number of large organizations such as SURF (van Rijswijk-Deij
et al., 2014) and CAIDA working to make active queries of the IPv4 and IPv6
routed space. These queries are used in order to map domains to IP addresses. This
is done in order to determine the bailiwicks of various domains, to determine the
size of the Internet, among other goals. CAIDA mapped queries to the entire IPv4
routed space. However due to the highly structured and purposeful nature of the
queries that were created, the responses received do not help identify botnet traffic the queries were legitimately created.
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2.5 Detecting and Mitigating Botnet DNS Covert Channels
Several individuals have written software to create DNS tunnels for varying
reasons and purposes. OzymanDNS, created by Dan Kaminsky (2004), and
DNSCAT2 (Bowes, 2015) create SSH tunnels over DNS. Additional tunneling tools
may attempt to encapsulate other protocols such as TCP, HTTP, or IP over DNS.
These tunnels essentially create a VPN allowing for the transfer of non-DNS data
over the DNS protocol and utilizing DNS servers. Further examples of tunneling
applications include dns2tcp, Iodine, and Heyoka. Each functions slightly
differently, either implementing encryption or not, utilizing different types of DNS
queries to create the tunnel. Of the freely available tunnel tools, DNSCAT2 has
been specifically created to act as command and control. It is meant to be used as
an offensive security tool.

2.6 Discussion
Though Born and Gustafson (2010); Couture (2010); Dietrich et al. (2011)
and Farnham (2013) have investigated identifying DNS tunnels, none has reported
on the creation of a tunnel over DNS when the security extensions to DNS are used.
As DNNSEC is implemented at an accelerating pace, if tunnels are created it is key
that they are able to be identified such that perhaps the damage they cause could
be mitigated. This represents a significant gap in the research and this study sought
to fill that gap by determining what theoretical covert channels exist and by
demonstrating a proof of concept DNSSEC enabled covert channel.

2.7 Summary
Despite the fact that botnets and their command and control have been
investigated for many years, a gap in the literature has been identified. The
communication methods of the bots have changed over time as infrastructure and
technology have changed. As DNSSEC was first introduced in 1999 by
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D. E. Eastlake et al. (1999) and in its present form by Arends et al. (2005a, 2005b),
but has recently begun to gain momentum in adoption as shown on the
DNSSECSTAT website Lamb (2016). With this change in rate of adoption, it is
essential to ensure that network administrators continue to have protection against
the exfiltration and infiltration of data by botnets or other malware that may decide
to use DNSSEC.
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CHAPTER 3. FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 Study Design
This final study design diverges from the methods and design put forth at
the time of the thesis proposal. The originally proposed research design sought to
investigate the question of whether or not methods in use by network administrators
to identify covert channels/tunneling over DNS would also identify tunnels over
DNSSEC. This entailed the use of Intrusion Detection Systems’ (e.g. Snort,
Security Onion, or Splunk) rules for identifying DNS tunnel traffic and the
application of those rules to real world DNS traffic. The real world DNS traffic
needed to have the characteristics of containing both DNS and DNSSEC traffic, it
needed to have the potential to have both malicious and benign traffic, and it
needed to be able to represent global usage of DNS. This data was not available
early enough for use in writing this document. Therefore, the study was modified to
focus on determining what features a covert channel in DNSSEC would have and to
determine if DNSSEC specific covert channels could exist.
As the modified study sought to determine the possible means of creating
covert channels in DNS and DNSSEC, the differences between the two versions of
the DNS protocol were examined.
DNS tunnels are commonly used by individuals for non-nefarious purposes,
though these uses nearly universally are implemented to circumvent some security
mechanism (and thus still match the definition for a “covert” channel). The
commonplace usage of tunnels, however, means that a number of freely available
DNS tunnel software programs exist. These are open source, which makes them
available for “looking under the hood” to determine how they accomplish their
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tunneling mechanisms. The study looked at the code implementation of two
different DNS tunneling programs, DNSCAT2 and Iodine. DNSCAT2 was released
in December of 2015 with the stated purpose of being for Command & Control
(Bowes, 2015). The code is well documented. Iodine was created for the stated
purpose of creating an IPv4 tunnel to allow Internet browsing where traffic may be
firewalled, but DNS traffic is allowed (Ekman, Anderson, & Bezemer, 2014).
The protocol analysis was cross referenced with the functionality of
DNSCAT2 and Iodine with the DNS and DNSSEC protocol functions, specifically
as implemented by BIND. These two tunneling tools are both open source whose
code bases have recently been updated and that implement advanced techniques for
creating tunnels, such as encryption in DNSCAT2 (Bowes, 2015) and such as VPN
creation in Iodine (Ekman et al., 2014). The functionality of PSUDP (Born, 2010)
was also considered, however there is no code base available openly.
A domain name was secured from a commercial registrar. Two custom name
servers were configured using Bind 9 and Ubuntu. One, a physical server, served as
the master nameserver and one, a virtual machine, served as the slave. Both were
configured to be authoritative only and were not configured to handle external
recursive queries. Upon configuring the zone for this domain, the appropriate
cryptographic keys were generated and the resource record and zones were signed.
A delgation of signing (DS) record was created and entered into the registrar’s
public interface. A virtual “bot” machine was created that also runs Ubuntu 14.04.
This machine served as the client in the Iodine and DNSCAT2 tunnel examinations.
Further, it served as the client in the prototype testing. The virtual machines were
hosted on a Windows 10 server. Figure 3.1 below illustrates the network
architecture of the constructed lab environment.
“Dig,” an open source tool that stands for “Domain Information Groper” was
used to test DNSSEC configurations. By carrying out domain name queries against
the custom domain, the DNSSEC results could be examined.
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Figure 3.1.: Research Lab Architecture

Each DNS query / response can either be a message for the creation / use of
a covert channel or a it can be a legitimate DNS query. In efforts to detect covert
communications, the query in whole or in part, alone or as part of a larger chunk of
network traffic, would need to be examined.
When certain changes are made to an authoritative name server, these
changes are logged in the systems administrator log (“\var\log\syslog”).
Observations were made of the entries in the master nameserver syslog as well as
the slave nameserver syslog, and were correlated with observations of the results of
“dig” queries to determine whether or not the change registered outside of the
nameservers.

3.1.1 Hypothesis
The study sought to determine if the possibility existed for a unique covert
channel in DNSSEC that did not exist before the security extensions were added.

33
The following hypothesis was examined: Unique covert channels are present in
DNSSEC.

3.1.2 Population
The population for this study was the set of all DNS queries and responses
(typically in pairs, though not always) that would be handled on a given DNS client
or server.

3.1.3 Sample
The nameservers for the specially registered domain were configured to
handle only queries for the domain for which they are authoritative. That is to say,
they did not act to forward queries on to other nameservers for which they do not
have answers. As the domain was not publicly registered with any search engines
and was not hosting any content, it was highly unlikely that any queries would be
coming in to the nameservers by individuals other than the researcher (however it
was not impossible). The sample was, therefore, limited to the queries specifically
made by the researcher to the domain and the responses received.
Due to the nature of the covert channel investigated, there are ten digits
available and eight of them are needed to encode a single character. During the
trial, one character and a fraction of the next character was encoded into the
available digits. As the chosen string was eight (8)characters long, this translated to
a 64 digit long encoding, requiring seven (7) queries to transfer.

3.1.4 Variables
A string of text was created to use for the data transfer process. This text,
specifically the string “P@$$w0rd” was chosen to represent sensitive, unauthorized
data that could be transmitted by a covert channel. This string was chosen due to
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the fact that the word “password” is one of the most common passwords in use.
Many password rule sets require a capital letter, a symbol, a number, and lowercase
letters. Therefore, the plain text “password” was modified to fit those rules using
symbols and numbers that continue to represent the letters they replace.
The string can be sent in plain text, can be encrypted, or encoded into hex,
base32/64, or binary. The string representation within a tunnel is contingent on the
formatting of the packet field and on possible means of obfuscating the traffic
beyond the covert channel. For example, the given string converted to binary is the
value “0101000001000000001001000010010001110111001100000111001001100100”.
Depending on the channel created, a different representation of the message would
be appropriate and/or necessary.
If the string is too long to be encoded into a single DNS query/response
packet, the string would need to be split into chunks of appropriate size to each to
be sent through the covert channel. The appropriate number of messages would
then need to be sent based on the total length of the text.
Further, there is a length of the field into which the text would be encoded.
This factors in to the number of messages that would need to be sent in order to
encode the entire stolen string.

3.1.5 Threshold
A covert channel is considered to be covert if it matches the definition set
forth by Tsai et al. (1990) of a covert channel. It is as follows:
“given a nondiscretionary security model M and its interpretation I(M )
in an operating system, any potential communication between two
subjects I(Si ) and I(Sj ) of I(M ) is covert if and only if any
communication between the corresponding subjects I(Si ) and I(Sj ) of
the model M is illegal in M ” (p.1).
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If a communications channel is able to transfer information between two
unauthorized parties, it would be considered to have construct validity with respect
to this definition of a covert channel.
Due to the specific configuration of the test lab, the external validity
(generalizability) is presently limited for the creation of the given covert channel. In
order to ensure greater generalizability, future work will need to be conducted by
creating different test labs with domains that are signed by their registrars or that
use other DNS implementations besides BIND.
There is significant variation expected in the amount of time it takes for a
change in a DNS record to propagate through the system. Therefore, the timing of
these results would be subjected to this random variation and would be a factor in
the reliability of the results.

3.2 Summary
This chapter provided the framework and methodology to be used in the
research study.
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS

4.1 Description of Data
Data was collected on existing covert channel software, on the DNS protocol,
on the DNSSEC extensions to the DNS protocol, and on the results of an attempt
to build a prototype covert channel using DNSSEC. The examined hypothesis
predicted that DNSSEC specific covert channels exist.

4.1.1 Existing Covert Channels
There are a number of mechanisms that are currently in use by covert
channels to encode data in a DNS message. DNSCAT2 has two mechanisms for
creating a connection between the client and the server. The first is a direct
connection without the use of name resolution. The user inputs an IP address and a
port, and traffic is sent between the two machines connected at that IP:Port
combination. This traffic is prepended by a tag with the text “dnscat". The
DNSCAT traffic, in the direct connection scenario, using only the TXT record. The
query would make a request with Query ID (QID) 0x5de4 for the TXT record for
“dnscat.2548700ebb14859f44456d6d6d6e6420". The response would be an answer
with QID of 0x5de4 and record type TXT with no content. The data in the direct
connection case is in the position of the Top Level Domain.
However, when the connection was created requiring a domain lookup, the
traffic shown in Figure 4.1 below was captured. The records used include CNAME,
MX, and TXT. Data was encoded bi-directionally. This data is all encrypted using
the Salsa 20 suite of cryptographic tools. The encrypted data is encoded in the
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Lower Level Domain location (LLD) in these queries, and the domain
(frankfrank.org) is in its traditional location in the queries and responses.

Figure 4.1.: DNSCAT Traffic Capture

When using the Iodine software, the DNS packets use the NULL question
type. The data is base64 encoded into the Lower Level Domain (LLD) and
appended to frankfrank.org. The packet sizes captured ranged from 113 bytes to
937 bytes.
In both the case of Iodine and of DNSCAT2, the data is encoded into the
domain name in a non-human readable format. The implementations of the tunnels
differ in the DNS question and answer types they choose to use to frame the data.

4.1.2 Covert Channel Prototype
A previously undocumented covert channel was created using the “serial”
field of the SOA record for the DNSSEC signed domain. A string was encoded into
binary and its binary digits were placed into the serial field of the zone file. The
zone was resigned, the bind service was reloaded, and then a query was made to the
domain by the client for the SOA record. The SOA record displayed the encoded
message on the client machine. The figure below diagrams this process.
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Figure 4.2.: SOA Serial Field Covert Channel
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS, DISCUSSION & RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Research Question
What features of DNSSEC could be exploited to create DNSSEC specific
covert channels? What characteristics would such a covert channel have? The study
investigated the hypothesis that DNSSEC specific covert channels exist.

5.1.1 DNS & DNSSEC Protocol
Past covert channels provide clues to ascertain what new covert channels
may look like. The features of the protocol that are or could be exploited were
considered. In so doing, it is important to note that both DNS and DNSSEC are
the same DNS protocol, they are not two separate protocols. DNSSEC exists due to
the addition of new record types and an expanded packet size in the original DNS
specification. All the fields in a DNS packet exist in a DNSSEC packet. The Z field
in a DNS packet contained 3 bits all set to zero. With the addition of DNSSEC, the
second and third bit can each be set to 1, depending on the query and response to
indicate Authenticated Data (AD) and Checking Disabled (CD), respectively. When
the DNS question label has its first two bits set to 01, the EDNS (extensions to
DNS) allow for the addition of the OPT pseudo-record, which includes a bit flag for
“DNSSEC OK" (DO).
EDNS can be used without DNSSEC. In those cases, it allows for the creation
of larger packets without the need for truncation or switching over into TCP from
UDP. Already existing in the DNS protocol is the possibility of tunneling data
through the domain label, typically through the lower level domains. This happens
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in the answer field of A and AAAA records, CNAME, MX, TXT, and NULL record
types, as demonstrated by two implementations of tunnels. There are many
Resource Record types, and several have been used by other tunnel implementations
(such as the now depricated KEY record by DNS2TCP or NS by the older version
of DNSCAT (Farnham, 2013)). The TTL field has been and can be used to create
a covert channel due to its unformatted nature Hoffman et al. (2012).
The RFCs associated with DNS and DNSSEC set forth requirements that
MUST and SHOULD be met in any DNS implementation. One such requirement is
that the RCODE (return code)field is ignored in queries as it is a field that the
server expects to define. A specially configured (i.e. non-conforming) tunnel server
could check that field for data and that would serve as a signal (or a small tunnel as
the RCODE field is 4 bits). This is not specific to DNSSEC, but it is worth noting
that this signal could exist and also could be observed relatively easily (likely
diminishing its usefulness as a covert signal). As DNS tunnel software typically
captures all incoming DNS traffic and forwards the traffic not relevant to the tunnel
on to the traditional DNS software, the tunnel server can be configured to be
nonconforming to specifications (and thus willing to accept packets that RFCs state
“MUST" or “SHOULD" be thrown away) while still having a conforming nameserver
running on a machine handling all non-tunnel queries.
Born (2010) proposed a very different type of tunnel driver that does not
generate its own traffic, but uses slack space in legitimate traffic to hide its own
content. Pointers are used within the DNS packet to allow for compression.
Whereas a traditional DNS name label starts with “00", the extended label begins
with “01", a label beginning with “11" indicates a pointer. The pointer will be
followed by an offset indicating where the DNS message parsing software should
read next. Traditionally, this is meant to point back to the first instance of the
domain name label in the packet (and thus the pointer would point to a part of the
packet before the pointer), however there is nothing in the RFC describing
compression Mockapetris:1987 that requires this. Therefore, Born argued, the
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pointer could point to the end of the packet where exfiltrated data is appended and
then retrieved by tunnel software. Extending this into the realm of DNSSEC, each
resource record contains a reference to the label. Each of these labels can be
replaced by a pointer. As a result of the data compression, slack space would be
created within the packet where covert data could be hidden. As a DNSSEC packet
can be as large as the resolvers’ memory buffers on either end of the message
exchange can handle, the amount of slack created by compression would have
increased size potential in a DNSSEC packet than in DNS alone. This mechanism is
not unique to DNSSEC, it would just be amplified by it. Such a tunnel would be
devastating to DNSSEC whose adoption has already been slow.
DNSSEC has been shown to protect against spoofed domains and cache
poisoning (P. Silva, 2009). It remains susceptible to DNS amplification attacks, as
shown by van Rijswijk-Deij et al. (2014). It provides a measure of protection against
covert channel usage where a question is asked in the A or AAAA record for
somecrazyencodedtext.example.com, due to the fact that the response would be an
authenticated non-existent domain (NXdomain) record. This does not stop
“somecrazyencodedtext” from being received by the rogue authoritative nameserver,
but, with the DS records and chain of trust fully in place, it does make it difficult to
return an encoded answer.
None of these methods of creating tunnels thus far discussed are DNSSEC
specific, though it seems that DNSSEC does little to mitigate data exfiltration via
tunnel.

5.2 Conclusions
Do DNSSEC specific tunnels exist? This study has determined the existence
of at one such tunnel, though it does not rule out the possibility of others.
When a domain is DNSSEC enabled and when a change is made to its zone’s
records, such as the addition of a new name server or a change in IP address, the
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zone must be resigned. In order for the zone change to be communicated from the
master to the slave nameserver, a field in the Start of Authority (SOA) resource
record called the “serial" must be incremented. The serial field is a ten digit
number. When configuring the master nameserver for frankfrank.org and observing
system logs, it became clear that a failure to increment the serial field would, as
expected, fail to trigger a zone transfer to the slave nameserver, even if the change
had been signed. However, a dig query of the SOA for the domain returned the
updated zone values. This observation suggested that the serial field could be used
as a covert channel, and could be used in a hijacked master nameserver without
alerting the system administrator with zone transfers.
The master nameserver will send a “notifies", but the slave nameserver will
not acknowledge it. Traditionally, the serial number is given a value to indicate the
date it was generated and the version change for that date, though there is no rule
requiring this format. With that form, for the first change made on July 16, 2016,
the serial number would take on the value “2016071601." In order to ensure that the
value is lower than this value, binary encoding of a stolen text could be used.
Once the data that one wants to send is obtained, it is then converted to
binary. In the initial trials, ten bits at a time were transmitted, with the final
message containing four bits was sent as only four bits. Three commands were
executed. 1. Modify the serial number in the zone file. 2. Resign the zone. 3.
Reload the BIND service. In a time from of between 90 seconds and seven (7)
minutes, a whois lookup reflected the changed serial number. No slave nameservers
were alerted to the change. This was repeated a sufficient number of times to
encode a theoretical sensitive, stolen data string (“P@$$w0rd”), which is 64 bits long
in binary. This channel encodes essentially one character per zone change. The
results of the whois queries are included as Appendix A. Any serial numbers with
leading zeros had those zeros truncated.
Though the serial field exists in the SOA record of the base DNS query, the
mechanism by which the global database is forced to recognize the update to a
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serial number that may or may not be an increment of the previous one is through
the zone signing action. The covert channel demonstrated in Appendix A would not
be possible without the DNSSEC zone signing process. Therefore the author rejects
the null hypothesis that there are no unique covert channel opportunities available
in the security extensions of DNS.
This prototype/proof of concept demonstrates that data transfer using the
SOA serial field is possible. However, there are a number of issues that would need
to be addressed long term if this covert channel were going to be built into a tunnel
application. The first, is that the prototype does not implement a method for
decoding on the client side. As text characters typically have 8-bit binary values
and the data field is 10 bits in length, total data lengths other than multiples of 80
bits will need to account for padding. This is especially true when leading zeros are
removed from full 10 bit transfers, making it difficult for the client to discern
whether a given packet is the final in the transmission or one requiring the addition
of padding with initial zeros.
A solution to this would be to encode the first bit of the serial to “1”. This
serves the purpose of ensuring that any leading zeros will not be truncated and can
serve as a signal that a covert message is incoming. The final bit in the serial would
be set to either the number 1 or 0, with this signaling that either another serial
number is incoming or that this is the final message in the stream, respectively.
With these two bits sandwiching the encoded character, each 8 bit value would be
encoded in a single packet and the recombination of the message on the client side
would be facilitated. The figure below encodes a simple three letter word (“and”) to
demonstrate how this padding would work
The transfer is slow. Stolen data would need to be chosen carefully, and the
model of attacker would need to be a patient one. The data uploading was, for
purposes of the proof of concept, carried out by hand. This would eventually be
implemented programatically. However, because DNS updates can take varying
amounts of time to propagate, an acknowledgment would be needed from the client
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Covert Message Encoding
Position

Initialize

Message

Terminate

First message (“a”)

1

01100001

1

Middle message (“n”)

1

01101110

1

Last message (“d”)

1

01100100

0

Figure 5.1.: Encoding for Serial Covert Channel of the Word “and”

before the next zone update could be made to be sure that the change had reached
its intended audience. As it stood, the entire password transfer took approximately
22 minutes, with the longest delay between transfers having been caused by human
error between transfer 1 and 2. After a rhythm was obtained, transfers occurred
fairly regularly at about 2 minute intervals (at :11, :13, :15, :17, & :19 minutes after
the hour).
The SOA serial channel represents a unidirectional transfer, such that the
data moves from server to client, and not in the more traditional direction.
However, as discussed in earlier sections, data infiltration and modification can seed
distrust in an information system, and possibly worse. As Ovide (2013) reported,
misinformation placed on a social media feed caused a stock market panic. More
carefully coordinated misinformation campaigns could decide democratic elections
or lead people to riot. Therefore, despite its clear shortcomings, such a covert
channel could still be powerful.
Attempts were made to replicate this result with changes to the serial field in
the frankfrank.org zone file without initiating the resigning process, and the
propagation did not occur. The author was unable to obtain these results using an
unsigned domain and serial record changes alone. This demonstrates that the
mechanism making this covert channel possible is the zone signing process. In a
signed domain, any change made to the zone without a resigning would be invalid.
Therefore, this implementation is absolutely appropriate to maintaining the integrity
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of the zone records. However, this suggests that other implementation details could
open the way for covert channels not necessarily based in the new Resource Records
associated with DNSSEC but rather in other implementation methods. The SOA
record contains several values which indicate times of creation, expiration, refresh,
etc. of the SOA record. It is unknown, but highly likely, that the use of these fields
to encode data could lead to a larger covert channel. This is left for a future study.
It is unclear whether or not these results could have been obtained had the
chain of trust been established for frankfrank.org. Attempts to test this without
access to a validated, signed domain proved to not be possible. However, specific
“dig” queries to frankfrank.org with the “+dnssec” flag from the lab’s bot machine
returned all the signed resource records despite the “AD” (Authenticated Data) bit
not being set. Since the data can be obtained in this way, these results indicate that
a client requesting this information will receive the covert information without any
of the typical characteristics that IDS’s and SIEM’s look for, such as increased
entropy in domain names or very long label lengths. This is not presently a covert
channel mechanism that IDS’s and SIEM’s are configured to identify and block. A
non-conforming tunnel program running on a client machine could be programmed
to recognize this result as a possible covert channel entry query.

5.3 Recommendations
Frequent updates to a zone are not abnormal, especially in large zones. It
has been recommended that administrators resign their zones once per day. With
this in mind, creating an IDS or SIEM signature that looks for rapid changes in
serial numbers may or may not be an effective approach to dealing with the
demonstrated covert channel. Since the bandwidth associated with this channel is
very low, and the latency is also very high, any attacker willing to use this method
would be a patient one. A patient attacker could easily modulate the zone changes
to be fewer than whatever threshold is decided does not block legitimate secure
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zones. This model of patient attacker needs to be kept in mind as covert channels
are considered in general. Often, low bandwidth channels are dismissed offhand
because data moves slowly through them, but data does move, nevertheless.
In the future, covert channels using DNS will, as the scenario above suggests,
evolve to avoid current detection mechanisms. Packets that create channels will
emerge that do not resemble those currently generated by DNSCAT2 and Iodine,
with long, random subdomains whose character frequencies and entropy values
differentiate them from normal, legitimate DNS traffic. As discussed,
non-conforming DNS servers and resolvers can be configured to break RFC
guidelines of what “MUST” and “SHOULD” be done with certain types of DNS
packet. Intrusion Detection Systems presently have methods of identifying such
nonconforming traffic and blocking it before it reaches the nameserver. Future
tunnel traffic will conform to the RFC guidelines, and thus is unlikely to be stopped
by these methods. The cat and mouse game will eventually select for covert channel
traffic that is truly covert in that it will be impossible to separate signal from noise.
Therefore, as the security community pushes for stronger safeguards of information,
DNSSEC adoption is a good place to start, however it does not go far enough to
protect against all the known attacks on DNS. With the discovery of the “serial”
covert channel, it also provides new vectors of attack. Therefore, additional security
measures will be needed to protect DNS long-term.

5.4 Significance
This study provides a methodology for the creation of a covert tunnel and
the examination of the results. This methodology could be used to test the covert
channel’s effectiveness on different DNS implementations, such as that by Windows.
The study is also significant in that it documents a previously undocumented
covert channel over DNS, and specifically over DNSSEC. This can immediately be
put to use by systems administrators who monitor their DNS traffic. Systems
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administrators can monitor the number of SOA records being requested and
received from a given domain, and can potentially catch the covert transfer of data
through the repeated use of this DNS record.
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Appendix A. Covert Channel Documentation

A.1 Covert Channel Whois Lookups
The transfer of data is demonstrated in the following series of Whois lookups
of the DNSSEC signed domain frankfrank.org. The SOA record has a “serial" field,
and this value changes with each lookup. In messages 1 - 6, if there are fewer than
10 digits, the differing number of digits would be added in leading zeros. The final
message (number 7) requires a single leading zero. When converted from binary to
text, these digits spell out the string “P@$$w0rd."
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Figure A.1.: Whois Lookup 1 - The first 10 digits are transferred
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Figure A.2.: Whois Lookup 2 - The leading zeroes are removed
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Figure A.3.: Whois Lookup 3
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Figure A.4.: Whois Lookup 4
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Figure A.5.: Whois Lookup 5
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Figure A.6.: Whois Lookup 6
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Figure A.7.: Whois Lookup 7 - The remaining 4 bits are sent
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Appendix B. Master Nameserver System Logs

B.1 Master Syslogs
The syslogs record certain changes to the BIND service and its associated
files. In the following figures, the service can be seen to be loaded, reloaded, the
zone file changed, and notifies sent. In figure B.2, the first attempt at decrementing
the SOA serial field is shown. It is recorded in the syslog as “zone serial has gone
backwards.”Figures B.3, B.4, and B.5 show the zone updates that led to the data
transfer. Figure B.7 shows the update to a serial incremented from the previous
version known by the slave - with an accompanying zone transfer demonstrated in
Appendix C, Figure C.3.
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Figure B.1.: System Log 1 for Master Nameserver
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Figure B.2.: System Log 2 for Master Nameserver
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Figure B.3.: System Log 3 for Master Nameserver
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Figure B.4.: System Log 4 for Master Nameserver
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Figure B.5.: System Log 5 for Master Nameserver
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Figure B.6.: System Log 6 for Master Nameserver
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Appendix C. Slave Nameserver System Logs
The syslogs record certain changes to the BIND service and its associated
files. In the following figures, the service can be seen to be loaded, reloaded, the
zone file changed, and notifies sent. In the slave nameserver, the zone transfer can
also be seen to begin and end. No zone transfers were recorded, nor was any
communication from the master nameserver, during the time the data was being
transferred over the covert channel.

C.1 Slave Nameserver Syslogs
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Figure C.1.: System Log 1 for Slave Nameserver
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Figure C.2.: System Log 2 for Slave Nameserver
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Figure C.3.: System Log 3 for Slave Nameserver

